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A Contextualist Approach to 
Hermeneutical Method 
JERRYH. GILL 
Traditionally defined as "the science of interpretation," 
hermeneutics has of late evolved into a full-fledged philosophical 
concern of its own. Flowing out of the two opposing branches of 
the early twentieth century's " search for meaning" (analytic and 
existentialist philosophy), hermeneutics stands today as the central 
intersection of dialogue within and among such diverse disciplines 
as philosophy, linguistics, the arts, political theory, psychology and 
theology. The issues and points of view are many and diverse.' 
My purpose here is to sketch, in broad strokes, the main contours 
of the landscape and to provide a suggested perspective or 
"inscape" of my own. 
The modern era of hermeneutical understanding was ushered 
in with the introduction of the historical-critical method of 
textual interpretation.2 In a much needed and eventually 
successful attempt to counteract the tyrannical dominance of 
authoritarian and/ or spiritualizing hermeneutical activity, modern 
scholarship turned to objective, scientific criteria and procedures 
for determining what a given text meant . I stress the past tense of 
the term "meant" advisedly, for the emphasis of the historical-
critical approach has consistently been on ascertaining what the 
text meant for the writer and those to whom it was originally 
addressed. By means of historical and textual research , including 
and especially archeological investigation, modern interpreters 
have sought to bridge the gap between the time of the text and 
their own, thereby facilitating a contemporary understanding of 
the text's meaning. Norman Perrin offers a fair account of this 
historical-critical method in the following passage: 
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In the case of texts from another time and another culture 
this can be an extremely complex and difficult task , 
involving many different considerations, but the theoretical 
principles involved are both firmly established and well 
understood. We need, further, to understand as far as we 
can the intent of the author in writing the text, and the 
meaning understood by those for whom the text was 
written. For all of this we need a number of different 
critical skills, and ultimately a measure of historical 
imagination, as we seek to understand the text as the 
author intended it to be understood, or as it was 
understood by those who first read it.3 
Over against what they perceived as the dehumanizing effects 
of the "cult of objectivity" existentialist thinkers arose, ad vocating 
a more personal, subjective approach to hermeneutics. 4 Not only 
is there no way to know the original meaning of a given text , 
since, as Kierkegaard demonstrated, "significant" meaning always 
transcends mere probability and observation, there is no need to 
know it, since what really matters for us is what the text means 
for today, here and now. In spite of their antipathy for each 
other, those advocating the historical-critical method and those 
touting the existentialist posture are agreed that there is a meaning 
to be found in the text, a message or lesson which can be 
discerned, either after appropriate scientific investigation , in the 
former case, or after proper demythologization, in the latter case. 
Bultmann is as clear as he is adamant that the meaning of 
biblical texts, for instance, must and can lie only in the fresh 
"self-understanding" which it brings to each of us. As he puts it: 
The real purpose of myth is not to present an objective 
picture of himself in the world in which he lives. Myth 
should be interpreted not cosmologically, but 
anthropologically, or better still, existentially. Myth speaks 
of the power or the powers which man supposes he 
experiences as the ground and limit of his world and of his 
own activity and suffering. He describes these powers in 
terms derived from the visible world, with its tangible 
objects and forces, and from human life, with its feelings, 
motives, and potentialities ... Hence the importance of the 
New Testament mythology lies not in his imagery, but in 
the understanding of existence which it enshrines.5 
Following along in the subjectivist mode, and drawin g as well 
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on the advice of the "new critics" to avoid the fallacy of assuming 
anyone can determine the writer's original intentions, the robust 
deconstructionists burst on the scene.6 This hermeneutical posture 
or non- posture maintains that the meaning of any text is what we 
make it , because not only are we unable to reconstruct its original 
meaning , either for the author or the readers, but language itself 
is incorrigibly vague, ambiguous and contradictory. The meaning 
of a text can never be ascertained and/ or interpreted, either for 
those then or for us now, for the simple reason that language will 
not stand still long enough to allow a single meaning--and this 
fact ought to be celebrated, rather than lamented! Any given 
statement can be given a number of meanings, sometimes even the 
opposite of what it appears to mean, as ironic utterances clearly 
illustrate. One of the more enthusiastic proponents of the 
application of this methodology to the theological enterprise is 
Mark Taylor. In personal conversation he said to me that it is 
"the most important thing to happen to theology in the latter half 
of the twentieth century." 
It is significant to note that the deconstructionist 
hermeneutical posture, while sharing the subjectivist emphasis of 
the existentialist approach, differs both from it and from the 
objectivism of the historical-critical perspective by insisting that 
meaning is never direct, but is, rathe r, entirely a function of the 
hearer's interpretive response. In other words, according to 
deconstructionist thinkers, the focus of meaning has shifted from 
the author, to the text itself, and finally to the reade r alone . In 
short, the activity of interpretation, as well as the meaning of a 
given text, has now become so indirect, the focus has become so 
"soft," as to be essentially nonexistent. Meaning is in the mind of 
the reader or hearer, period. 
It is, of course, impossible to deny both the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of these hermeneutical postures. The trick is 
to devise some way of integrating the former and avoiding the 
latter without ending up with a lumpy eclecticism. Is there a way 
to maintain the objectivity and authority of the text, together with 
contemporary and personal relevance, and yet acknowledge the 
indirect , open- texture of language? By itself the historical-critical 
method is limited , both in results and scope of application. 
Existentialist hermeneutics tends to be not only a-historical but 
anti-historical and social. Deconstructionism makes a valuable 
point, but becomes pointless--and indeed, meaningless--when 
applied to itself. So, one must ask, in Peggy Lee's words, "Is that 
all there is?" 
My own suggestion at this juncture is to urge the development 
of a contextua/ist approach to hermeneutics, one which 
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incorporates the emphases and concerns at each of the above 
postures. More specifically, a contextualist hermeneutic seeks an 
understanding of a text in which meaning is mediated in and 
through the historical, existential and linguistic dimensions of 
human experience simultaneously. There simply is no need to 
choose any of these aspects of our common life as the primary 
mode, or to assume that they are mutually exclusive . For, clearly, 
our day-to-day existence does not come compartmentalized in 
such a manner. The following diagram indicates the relationship 















As I see it, contextualist hermeneutic is comprised of at least 
three main themes, each of which deserves a brief explication. 
The following remarks constitute my own "inscape" (with thanks 
to Gerard Manley Hopkins) into the hermeneutical thicket 
sketched above. 
II 
First, a contextualized perspective acknowledges the deeply 
social and relational character of language and speech. People 
speak, not only in order to be understood, but because they are 
understood. It is language which mediates social reality to us, 
both initially and continuously, and which brings us into the 
human community, both as members and as selves . Thus the 
hermeneutical task is surely grounded in a basic knowledge of 
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what a given text meant in its original human context, both 
historically and linguistically. This historical-critical concern is 
complemented, rather than set aside, by an equally sincere concern 
for the meaning of a text in the contemporary setting. Moreover, 
neither of these dimensions is obviated by a sensitivity to the 
flexible, open-textured quality of language, a quality which is 
necessitated by the ever-evolving social tasks in which language is 
employed. 
One thinker who has contributed a great deal to this 
contextualist perspective is the social psychologist George Herbert 
Mead.7 Mead stressed the social character of the human self, and 
the crucial role played by language in the composition of both 
culture and personhood. He termed the process by means of 
which both are constituted, " symbolic interaction," and he argued 
cogently for the "thick" understanding of the integral relationship 
between language and reality which comprises the fabric of human 
existence. Language is more than a mere system of signs for 
designating parts and aspects of the world . It is, rather, an 
organic form of human behavior that creates and shapes our world 
as well as describing it. Here is how he states it: 
The central factor in such adjustment is "meaning." 
Meaning arises and lies within the field of the relation 
between the gesture of a given human organism and the 
subsequent behavior of this organism as indicated to 
another human organism by that gesture. If that gesture 
does so indicate to another organism the subsequent (or 
resultant) behavior of the given organism, then it has 
meaning. In other words, the relationship between a given 
stimulus--as a gesture--and the later phases of the social 
act for which it is an early (if not the initial) phase 
constitutes the field within which meaning originates and 
exists. Meaning is thus a development of something 
objectively there as a relation between certain phases of 
the social act; it is not a psychical addition to that act and 
it is not an "idea" as traditionally conceived .... The social 
process, as involving communication, is in a sense 
responsible for the appearance of new objects in the field 
of experience of the individual organisms implicated in 
that process. Organic processes or responses in a sense 
constitute the objects to which they are responses; that is 
to say, any given biological organism is in a way 
responsible for the existence (the meanings they have for 
it) of the objects to which it physiologically and chemically 
responds. There would, for example, be no food--no 
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edible objects--if there were no organisms which could 
digest it. And similarly, the social process in a sense 
constitutes the objects to which it responds or to which it 
is an adjustment. That is to say, objects are constituted in 
terms of meanings within the social process of experience 
and behavior through the mutual adjustment to one 
another of the responses or actions of the various 
individual organisms involved in that process, an 
adjustment made possible by means of a communication 
which takes the form of a conversation gestures in the 
earlier evolutionary stages of that process and of language 
in its later stages. s 
Another contributor to the contextualist approach is the 
mature Ludwig Wittgenstein.9 He emphasized the social and active 
dimension of speech by likening it to the various "games people 
play." He did not intend thereby to trivialize or demean linguistic 
interchange. Rather, he sought to highlight its pragmatic nature, 
that it is grounded in our shared tasks and purposes, and thus that 
it is a way we do things in and with our common world. 
Wittgenstein likened speech to a toolbox, to chess and to the 
exchange of money in order to suggest that meaning is, at the 
deepest level, a function of use in context. After all , apart from 
some concrete use in a particular setting by and to a specific 
person(s), a given string of sounds and/ or markings cannot be said 
to have any meaning at all. The following is a representati ve 
Wittgenstienian insight: 
You say: the point isn't the word, but its meaning, and yo u 
think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the 
word , though also different from the word. Here the 
word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that 
you can buy with it. (But contrast: money, and its 
use .) ... A main source of our failure to understand is that 
we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. 
Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A 
perspicuous representation produces just that understanding 
which consists in "seeing connexions" .... 10 
Hans-George Gadameru has also contributed to a contextualist 
understanding of hermeneutics by means of his explorations in the 
phenomenology of language. Like Wittengenstein , Gadamer 
focuses on the participatory and interactionary aspects of linguistic 
communication, particularly through the notions of "play" and 
"conversation." These notions underline both the creative and 
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dialogical character of speech, indeed, even to the point of 
stressing the significance of silence in an overall understanding of 
meaning. For Gadamer, language is organic; it grows and dies. In 
addition, language is neither optional nor arbitrary; all humans 
participate in it to some degree and, at the primordial level, it 
arises in the warp and weft of concrete daily existence. As he 
says: 
Language is by no means simply an instrument, a tool. 
For it is in the nature of the tool that we master its use, 
which is to say we take it in hand and lay it aside when it 
has done its service . That is not the same as when we take 
the words of a language, lying ready in the mouth, and 
with their use let them sink back into the general store of 
words over which we dispose. Such an analogy is false 
because we never find ourselves as consciousness over 
against the world and , as it were grasp after a tool of 
understanding in a wordless condition. Rather, in all our 
knowledge of ourselves and in all knowledge of the world, 
we are always already encompassed by the language that is 
our own. We grow up, and we become acquainted with 
men and in the last analysis with ourselves when we learn 
to speak. Learning to speak does not mean learning to use 
a preexistent tool for designating a world already somehow 
familiar to us; it means acquiring a familiarity and 
acquaintance with the world itself and how it confronts 
us.12 
III 
A second motif of a contextualist hermeneutic is an insistence 
on the active and pragmatic character of linguistic communication. 
Here again, the later Wittgenstein's work has proven to be most 
helpful, for it gave rise to the insights of the Oxford philosopher , 
J. L. Austin.n Austin began by noting that frequently we do 
more than merely speak when we use language, we sometimes 
accomplish deeds as well. When, for example, we say "I 
apologize," or "I pronounce you husband and wife" in the 
appropriate circumstances, etc., we are performing the act of 
apologizing and pronouncing. Austin dubbed such utterances 
"performatives," and he suggested that as an important form of 
speech they break down the traditional dichotomies between 
language and reality, and between factual judgments and value 
judgments. In his later work, Austin suggested that every 
"speech-act" consists of at least three dimensions of meaning, 
each of which is essential to its overall significance. 
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Take, for example, the sign which used to hang in British 
railway lavatories: "Gentlemen Lift the Seat." One might well ask 
whether this is a stipulative definition, an empirical description, 
an imperative or an invitation to upperclass larceny. Everything 
depends on context and use, and in spite of the fact that it is both 
enlightening and entertaining to play around with possible 
meanings, it is roughly clear what this sign means. However, 
Austin would surely suggest that there is a "referential" dimension 
to the utterance (there must be gentlemen and a seat, for instance) , 
as well as an "intentional" dimension (what the sign-makers 
intended) and a "responsive" dimension (some signs are so 
constructed as to give rise to unintended responses). All of these 
aspects of meaning must be taken into consideration when 
interpreting the sign. 
It is this pragmatic thrust of language which counteracts the 
unbridled relativism of deconstructionism. For, although any 
given statement is subject to a wide variety of readings , in the 
vast majority of cases the context either provides sufficient 
guidance by which to ascertain the meaning, or sufficient 
feedback by which to determine what went wrong in the case of 
misunderstanding. To acknowledge the possibility of multiple 
meanings and misunderstandings is a far cry from affirming that 
concrete interpretation is impossible. As Wittgenstein put it: " If I 
say 'The ground was quite covered with plants,' do you want to 
say that you don't know what I mean until I give you a definition 
of a 'plant'?" Of course, many readings are possible, even here , 
but that does not mean that some are not better than others. 14 
Another thinker, once again a phenomenologist, who f eeds 
into the pragmatist current of a contextualist approach to 
hermeneutics is Maurice Merleau-Ponty.15 His work on the 
pivotal role of human embodiment in the composition of our 
particular form of !if e, especially as it involves the use of speech 
as a form of bodily behavior, is of front-rank significance. 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that through embodiment and language we 
interact with and shape our world, both physical and social. In 
short, he contends that our world is in large measure linguistically 
constituted by means of our interaction with each other in our 
common environment for specific shared tasks. We can neither 
separate our "inner" selves from our interactional relationships 
with the world, nor can we grasp reality and/ or its meaning 
directly, apart from these relationships. However, reflection can 
"set back ... to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks 
from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to 
the world and thus brings them to notice."16 
Mediated Meaning: A Conte.xtualist Approach to Henneneutical Method 35 
IV 
Third, a contextualist stance toward hermeneutical activity 
recognizes that, at the primordial level, language and meaning are 
fundamentally metaphoric in nature. The work of Owen Barfield 
is highly significant here.17 He calls attention to a deep 
contradiction which underlies our modern view of language. On 
the one hand , we are generally committed to the idea that people 
in ancient and classical (not to say "primitive") times imbibed 
myth and metaphor, while we in modern times have " put away 
such childish things" in favor of more precise, scientific speech. 
On the other hand, we are equally committed to a theory of 
language which entails that it begins with specific, literal 
meanings and only later are metaphoric and symbolic meanings 
derived. But both cannot be true. It cannot be the case that 
metaphors build on literal meanings and that the vast majority of 
literal terms are in fact "dead" metaphors! 
Barfie ld argues that at its inception, whether with respect to 
the species or the individual, language must be endemically poetic 
in the sense that it does not stand over against or represent reality, 
but rather functions symbiotically with it in the mutual 
composition of our experienced and known world. Primordial 
speech unites thought and reality, analytic speech divides them. 
Both, of course, are necessary to human life, but it is clear that 
the unity must exist, as a Gestalt, be/ ore analysis can take place. 
Thus both the historical-critical method and deconstructionism 
must acknowledge a more fundamental level of meaning that 
provides the context or the foothold for their own activity to have 
meaning. We can only analyze, we can only deconstruct, what we 
have understood as meaningful in the first place. 
One of the most controversial books in philosophical circles in 
recent years has been Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. is Kuhn's insights into the development of scientific 
thought lend support to the case for a contextualist hermeneutic. 
In brief, he contends that in order for any scientific activity to be 
carried out there must exist some theoretic framework, some 
unarticulated assumptions, forming what Kuhn calls the dominant 
paradigm, according to which this activity, including the theoretic 
level, gets its direction and meaning. He also maintains that at 
certain crucial junctures in the history of science, these paradigms 
shift, causing a revolution in the way scientists think and work. 
The Copernican and Einsteinian revolutions are examples of such 
shifts in paradigms. 
What is pivotal for our topic is the idea, espoused by an 
increasing number of scientific thinkers, that all meaningful 
activity and thought must take place within some social and 
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linguistic context. Contrary to the warnings of some, this does not 
mean that all truth and meaning are relative in the subjectivist, 
skeptical sense. Rather, it simply means that serious attention 
must be paid to the shape and direction, to the concrete 
particulars, of the context within which linguistic meaning arises 
when one engages in the task of interpretation. From the fact that 
no meaning is contextless it does not follow that meaningful 
communication is impossible. 
There are many points of connection between the notion of 
paradigm and that of metaphor in the primordial sense. It is 
within what Stephen Pepper called our "root metaphors" l9 that we 
live and move and have our being, at both the practical and 
theoretic levels of our common human existence. One could argue 
that the history of any culture, especially in relation to 
intercultural encounter and dialogue, exhibits shifts in root 
metaphors, or mythologies, parallel to the paradigm shifts in 
scientific thought. It is essential that hermeneutical activity be 
sensitive to and make constructive use of the differences and 
developments within and among various historical and cultural 
contexts.20 
One other important thinker whose work supports a 
metaphorical understanding of the contextualist approach to 
hermeneutics is the Harvard philosopher, Nelson Goodman. In his 
delightfully deep little book, Ways of World making , 21 Goodman 
invites us to think of the various worlds we inhabit, such as the 
worlds of science, economics, art, religion, morality, etc. , as the 
result of our collaborative, creative interaction with our 
multidimensional environment. They grow out of each other, 
overlap with each other, and at times conflict with each other. 
These worlds are not fabricated arbitrarily, but arise as we engage 
in various shared activities and purposes. Nevertheless, they 
develop organically out of basic alternative ways of 
conceptualizing reality. This sort of open-mindedness entails, to 
be sure, a kind of relativism, but Goodman insists that this does 
not mean "anything goes." He advocates a "relativism with rigor" 
in order to distinguish truly helpful root metaphors from wild-
eyed word salad. In his own words: 
What I have said so far plainly points to a radical 
relativism; but severe restraints are imposed. Willingness 
to accept countless alternative true or right world-versions 
does not mean that everything goes, that tall stories are as 
good as short ones, that truths are no longer distinguished 
from falsehoods, but only that truths must be otherwise 
conceived than as correspondence with a ready- made 
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world . Though we make worlds by making versions, we 
no more make a world by putting symbols together at 
random than a carpenter makes a chair by putting pieces 
of wood together at random. The multiple worlds I 
countenance are just the actual worlds made by and 
answering to true or right versions. Worlds possible or 
impossible supposedly answering to false versions have no 
place in my philosophy.22 
v 
What, then, are the potential dividends for religious life and 
understanding of this contextualist hermeneutical stance? Clearly 
such an approach entails a mediational view of revelation. By this 
I mean a view which sees God's activity in the world as mediated 
in and through historical, social and natural processes and events. 
For the Christian faith the notion of incarnation focuses this 
understanding of revelation in an axial fashion. "The Word 
became flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld the glory,. .. full 
of grace and truth." The emphasis here is on discerned glory 
amidst the significant dimensions of life , not on supernatural 
intrusions from outer space. Even and especially in Christ we see 
through a glass, darkly. I say "especially" because it is only by 
means of a mediated mode of revelation that God can embody and 
communicate honest love and respect for human decision and 
responsibility, as John Hick has so profoundly made clear.23 
A contextualist hermeneutic will come at the S criptures in a 
similar manner. As a most important mediator of the nature and 
meaning of divine revelation, the texts of the Bible must be 
interpreted in terms of every relevant dimension: historically, 
literarily, culturally, existentially and imaginatively. What they 
meant originally, as best as can be determined , what they have 
meant through the centuries, what they mean to us now, and what 
they may mean to readers now and in the future--all these 
contexts mediate significant meaning, even for one another. The 
focus should be on the various root metaphors in each context and 
on how they function for the people therein, always with an eye 
to what they may yet reveal in our own and other settings. The 
Scripture is a record and interpretation of the community of 
believers' interaction with what they discern as God's activity in 
their midst. Two examples come readily to mind. Martin Luther 
King's interpretation of Israel's approach to the "Promised Land" 
in relation to the cause of Black people in America and the Civil 
Rights Movement was more than mere application, while being 
less specific than simple allegory. It constitutes an exemplary case 
of contextualist methodology. In a similar vein, the Reformist 
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dimension of the Christian Feminist Movement constitutes, in my 
view, a sound contextualist interpretation of Paul's powerful, if 
belatedly understood , remark that "In Christ there is ... no male or 
female" (Galatians 3:28). The true meaning of this remark has 
only begun to dawn on the Christian Church. 
The symbolism and ritual of worship will also be seen in a 
different light as a result of a contextualist hermeneutic. 
Participation in traditional and/ or contemporary worship need not 
be viewed as merely that, but can be appreciated as a mediational 
means of participating in a multidimensional reality, wherein 
significance and value arise through active commitment to and 
involvement with the people and events of one's context. 
Baptism, the saying of the creeds, and the Eucharist, for example, 
are activities we engage in as a community, by means of which we 
accomplish or perform certain tasks or acts, and which function 
as the primordial metaphors for expressing the discernments and 
commitments that lie at the center of our common faith and life. 
This is not to say, of course, that symbols and rituals never 
become obsolete or that fresh ones can never be created. It is 
only to say that such alterations should be effected slowly and 
broadly, and that when they occur they will do so as a result of 
contours of communal needs, values and goals. Although it has 
come as a shock to many Roman Catholics, the reform instituted 
by the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s with respect to 
the liturgy of the Mass strikes me as an excellent example of a 
contextualist interpretation of the worship ritual. It seeks a 
middle ground between past significance and contemporary life, 
without self-destructing into sheer subjectivism. Moreover, such 
reform establishes connections with other dimensions of the 
Christian community, thereby contributing to the unity of the 
Church. Catholic and Protestant dialogue, as well as common 
worship and social action, are no longer simply a dream. 
Finally, theology itself must also be affected by a contextualist 
hermeneutic. The traditional model of theology as a metaphysical 
counterpart to Newtonian science is clearly no longer viable. This 
includes all pontifical theologies, of both the philosophical and 
dogmatic varieties, left and right. Moreover, the individualized 
theologies of the existentialist and deconstructionist brands are of 
little help over the long and broad pull. The theologies most 
attentive to the contextualist motif would appear to be those being 
forged in the socio-political arena on the one hand and those 
working the "New Hermeneutic" field on the other hand. The 
former must be careful to allow for the distinction between the 
mediating context and that which is being mediated, lest the truth 
of revelation be equated with the expedient. The latter must pay 
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increasing attention to developing the logic of language and story 
in a truly metaphoric mode, otherwise we shall once again be 
faced with a no-win choice between objectivism and subjectivism. 
To my mind, the theologian who is doing the most creative, yet 
substantive work in this mode is Sallie McFague.24 Drawing on 
the insights of the likes of Robert Funk and Dan Via, as well as 
insights of many of the thinkers already mentioned above, 
McFague explores the ramifications of approaching theology as an 
activity more akin to aesthetic criticism than to science or 
philosophy. Focusing on the role of parable as central both to 
Jesus's life and work and to the ongoing life of the Church, she 
stresses the "story" character of truth in general, as well as the 
metaphoric and mediational nature of revelation in particular. In 
McFague's words: 
The parables of the New Testament are united by a 
number of characteristics, of which one of the most 
outstanding is their concern with relationships of various 
kinds. What is important in the parables is not who the 
characters are (a static notion) but what they do (a 
dynamic one). The plot is always the heart of a parable, 
what a character or several characters decide in matters 
having to do with their relationships with each other. 
Whether one thinks of the parable of the Prodigal Son, the 
Good Samaritan, the Unjust Steward, or the Great Supper, 
it is relationships and decisions about them that are 
critical. Just as the central Old Testament religious 
language is relational--focused on the covenant between 
God and persons and their way of being in the world in 
community--likewise, if we look at Jesus as a parable of 
God, we have no alternative but to recognize personal, 
relational language as the most appropriate language about 
God. Whatever more one may wish to say about him, he 
was a person relating to other persons in loving service and 
transforming power.25 
The cardinal concern for a contextual, mediational 
understanding of hermeneutics, in addition to its emphasis on 
those factors adumbrated in the foregoing pages, is the 
acknowledgement that whatever truth we possess, we carry in 
"earthen vessels." No truth can be revealed apart from the 
particulars of a concrete context, but no particular context can be 
equated with revealed truth. Mediated meaning must be shared 
both confidently and with humility, a rare and difficult 
combination, but a necessary one. 
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VI 
Permit me a brief "concluding unprofessional postscript." 
have no idea how my initial mentor, Professor Traina, will react 
to the foregoing reflections. On the one hand, my concern to 
allow the scripture to "speak for itself," liberated from the 
tyranny of traditional and/ or parochial agendae, is certainly 
traceable to his tireless and insightful efforts in the courses I took 
with him thirty years ago. On the other hand, he may complain 
that I have collapsed the distinction between interpretation, 
application and correlation. To this I can only answer that this 
distinction must be called into question, not in order to do away 
with it altogether, but in order to do justice to the manner and 
degree to which we are embodied and embedded in the language 
and thought patterns of our own heritage, both traditional and 
contemporary. Although there is no way we can extricate 
ourselves from these webs of meaning in order to be eyeball-to-
eyeball with truth and/ or reality, we can, by acknowledging both 
the limitations and the functional adequacy of our own knowledge 
claims, be confident without being arrogant in our hermeneutica l 
endeavors. It is this circumspect confidence at which a 
contextualist hermeneutic aims--and that toward which Robert 
Traina pointed his students by means of his own example. 
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